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Abstract—Smart cards rely on pseudorandom number gener-
ators to provide uniqueness and freshness in their cryptographic
services i.e. encryption and digital signatures. Their implemen-
tations are kept proprietary by smart card manufacturers in
order to remain competitive. In this paper we look at how
these generators are implemented in general purpose computers.
How architecture of such generators can be modified to suit the
smart card environment. Six variations of this modified model
were implemented in Java Card along with the analysis of their
performance and randomness. To analyse the randomness of the
implemented algorithms, the NIST statistical test suite is used.
Finally, an overall analysis is provided, that is useful for smart
card designers to make informed decisions when implementing
pseudorandom number generators.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the last decade, besides the use of the smart card tech-
nology in the banking and the telecommunication industries,
such technology gained acceptance in other fields such as
security tokens (keys), driving licenses, national ID cards,
student ID cards, social security, health, travel documents, and
passports. In most of these fields, smart cards use applications
that require generation of session keys, DSS signatures, and
pseudorandom padding bits, etc. These functionalities require
a secure and unpredictable pseudorandom number generator
for their security [1].
This paper examines what is randomness and how the
general-purpose computers generate it. It also looks at security
requirements that a Pseudorandom Number Generator (PRNG)
has to satisfy for use in cryptographic applications. A generic
model for implementing a PRNG is analysed along with
six variations of the model is implemented on smart cards.
These implementations are evaluated on their performance and
subjected to randomness tests.
The structure of the paper is as follows: section two intro-
duces pseudorandom numbers, their implementation method-
ology in terms of general-purpose computers and their de-
sirable properties. Furthermore, it describes the evaluation
criteria for randomness of the generator with the NIST SP 800-
22 statistical test suite [2]. Section three explains the general
architecture of smart cards and the constraints on the smart
card based PRNG. The generic model is described in section
four, along with the implementation details for each of the
six algorithms. Theoretical and experimental proof of their
security and randomness is illustrated in section five. Finally,
section six offers an overall analysis of the research and of its
outcomes.
A. Motivation
As most cryptographic mechanisms requires some sort of
input from a random number generator. A weakness in the gen-
erator will eventually weaken the cryptographic mechanism. If
the generator is weak, it can cause the entire mechanism to be
insecure. This is evident from the results shown in the reverse
engineering of the Mifare Classic [3], [4], [5], [6].
For a generator to be cryptographically secure the generated
sequences should be random that an adversary is unable
to predict future or determine past sequences. A preferable
choice is to have hardware based True Random Bit Generator
(TRNG) [7], [8], [9]. However, on a resource restrict device
like smart cards, having TRNG may be vulnerable to the
differential fault analysis [10], [11]. Furthermore, a number
of standards have stringent requirements for a TRNG. For
example, in the Common Criteria [12] (German scheme) the
requirements for the TRNG are defined in the AIS31 [13]. It
states that on each activation of the generator, tests specified in
the FIPS 140-2 [14] should be performed. This impose a huge
computational cost on the TRNG mechanism and it might also
adversely affect the security of the generator against attacks
like SPA/DPA [15] and template attacks [16]. As discussed by
the [17] that these stringent requirements make it difficult to
have an efficient and usable TRNG. Therefore, the alternative
would be to have a Pseudorandom Number Generator (PRNG).
A PRNG implementation in computers are usually tested using
number of statistical tests (like in the NIST SP 800-22 [2]
test suite there are 15 tests). However, the Common Criteria
(German Scheme) details the list of test in AIS20 [18] which
consist of only five tests. The reason behind this may be smart
card’s restricted resources. However, to have an assurance that
a PRNG in smart cards is equally produce random sequences
as a computer based PRNG. Smart card based PRNG should
also be rigorously tested using the same statistical test batteries
as a computer based PRNG. In this paper, we provide six
PRNGs based on different cryptographic constructs along with
memory usage and performance measurements. In addition, all
of these PRNGs are tested using the NIST SP 800-22 test suite.
2II. PSEUDORANDOM NUMBERS
In this section, we first explain pseudorandom numbers,
followed by how they are generated, and finally the description
of the NIST statistical test suite.
A. Pseudorandom Number Generator
A PRNG defined by [1] is an ”algorithm which given a truly
random binary sequence of length k, output a binary sequence
of length l >>k which appears to be random”. According to
this definition, on the elementary level, a generator consists
of a function called a generation algorithm that takes a
small random string and converts it into a longer string that
is statistically independent of the input string. Input to a
generation algorithm is known as the seed and it is critical
to the randomness of the generator’s output. The seed values
are taken from an entropy source where entropy is a measure
of disorder, randomness, or variability in a closed system.
The randomness or disorder is relative to the observer, if the
observer is unable to predict the scale of disorder, then the
entropy source provides high entropy [2]. Figure 1 shows an
elementary level model of a PRNG.
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Fig. 1. Generic Model for PRNG
Additionally, PRNG should also have a one-way property,
making it computationally difficult to find the input string from
the generated output sequence. Finally, the overall model of a
PRNG should have the desirable properties that are explained
in next section. There are well defined standards such as NIST
SP 800-90 [19] and ISO/IEC 18031 [20] that provides the
guideline on how a PRNG can be implemented in the computer
environment. In this paper, we follow these guidelines and only
changing/modifying when required or compelled by smart card
environment.
B. Desirable Properties of Pseudorandom Number Generator
There are five properties that are desirable in any imple-
mentation of PRNG [5]. The first property is a functional one
and other four are security properties.
1) PRNG outputs should be computationally indistinguish-
able from TRNG.
2) Backtracking Resistance: Even after the compromise
of the internal state, an adversary will not be able
to generate past output. The PRNG’s internal state
is actually its memory. The values stored in it may
be counter, user input, predefined system values and
cryptographic keys, etc. All these values are used during
the generation process, and they serve as input to the
generation algorithm along with the seed.
3) Prediction Resistance: An algorithm provides prediction
resistance if an adversary is unable to predict future
outputs, even after the compromise of the internal state
of the generator. For this, a generator should regularly be
reseeded. Reseeding mean changing the entropy sources
on detection of a compromise or at the end of its
lifetime.
4) Backward Secrecy: An adversary is not able to predict
past outputs, even if s/he observes all future outputs
from a given point of time. His/her knowledge about the
generated sequences is restricted to the first observation
and all previous outputs will always remain hidden.
5) Forward Secrecy: An adversary will still not be able to
predict future outputs, even after observing past outputs.
The probability of predicting future values should not be
increased by observing the outputs over time.
Statistical tests verify the first desirable property by measuring
the level of randomness in the generated output. Several
statistical test suites are available such as Diehard [6], TestU01
[3] and NIST SP 800-22 [2] that only give an assurance that
there are no repeated patterns in the bit sequence generated.
However, no set of statistical tests can absolutely certify
a generator as being appropriate for usage in a particular
application, i.e. statistical testing cannot serve as a substitute
for cryptanalysis [2].
C. NIST SP 800 - 22
For evaluation of randomness in a generated sequence,
there is no uniform methodology. However, several statistical
test suites are available to perform this task. Among them,
we have chosen the NIST statistical test battery for the
following reasons. Firstly, it contains many famous tests from
the Diehard battery with some extra tests. Secondly, It was
used in the AES evaluation process to check the randomness
of the output sequences of each candidate algorithm.
The NIST SP 800-22 consists of the tests mentioned in
Appendix B, along with their input parameters used to evaluate
sequences generated by the implemented algorithms. After
pseudorandom sequences generated by the PRNG were sub-
jected to NIST statistical tests, the results were interpreted
in two ways, as recommended by [2]. The proportion of se-
quences passing test that analyses how many output sequences
pass a particular test out of total sequences generated by
the algorithm. The second test is uniform distribution of P-
value that analyses the distribution of passing sequences in
the output to observe any irregularity. Both methods analysed
the test results on the generated output to see the ratio and
distribution of passing sequences.
III. SMART CARD TECHNOLOGY
In this section, we review the smart card technology and its
implications on the PRNG design.
A. Smart Card Hardware
Smart card is a resource-scarce platform that typically
consists of a central processing unit (CPU), read only memory
(ROM), random access memory (RAM), electrical erasable
programmable read only memory (EEPROM), and a Crypto-
Coprocessor [21]. In the smart card, data can be stored in ROM
3and EEPROM. ROM houses the Card Operating System and
EEPROM stores the data that needs to be updated over the
operational lifetime of the card. The EEPROM memory has
restricted write/erase cycles, and it ranges between 100,000 to
1,000,000 cycles over the entire range of operating tempera-
tures and voltages [1], after that it becomes inoperable.
For its entire lifetime, the smart card remains in the pos-
session of the cardholder [22]. This allows an adversary to
perform attacks on the card hardware or software security
without any physical access restriction on it. As essential data
is stored in EEPROM, if there is no protection mechanism
available, an adversary can effectively change the values stored
in EEPROM to his/her choice. However, cards provided by a
respectable manufacturer will offer adequate security measures
to prevent such attacks.
B. Smart Card Platform Constraints on PRNGs
For any PRNG, a random source of entropy is required,
from which the generation algorithm takes a seed value and
generates a pseudorandom number. Such an entropy source in
PCs can be typing speed, noise recorded by a microphone,
processes in queues and their time/status.
However, in the smart card, entropy sources are limited
and the card cannot rely either on an internal mechanism to
generate or on external source to provide the entropy required
by the PRNG. Besides the problem of a good entropy source,
smart cards are also constrained by the amount of memory
and by processing capabilities. Therefore, an ideal solution
would be a hardware-based PRNG. Current random number
generators in the smart card micro-controllers are generally
based on Linear Feedback Shift Registers (LFSR) driven by
voltage-controlled oscillators [1].
However, sequences produced purely by LFSRs have a high
level of linearity, which makes it easy for an adversary to
guess internal values and to predict future outputs. Therefore,
for cryptographic use they do not provide the required level
of security [23]. Besides the hardware-based models, a PRNG
can also base purely upon software implementations. However,
the choices of these are restricted in smart cards due to:
1) Limited memory capacity and processing speed of the
smart card. 2) Non-availability of good entropy sources and
3) Reseeding is not implemented for security reasons. Finally,
4) FIPS 140-2 [14] restrictions.
Technically, reseeding the smart card is possible and the
motivation to do so is to provide prediction resistance to
the PRNG. This can be implemented by requesting reseeding
when smart card is inserted into the card reader. However, if
the provision for changing the data in the generator is provided
after the card manufacturing, then an adversary may attack this
mechanism to his/her advantage, enabling him/her to predict
future values. As a result, not enabling an adversary to provide
or manipulate the input to the PRNG prevents the retrieval of
the internal state of a generator.
IV. PSEUDORANDOM NUMBER GENERATORS IN SMART
CARDS
In this section, we present a generic model for PRNG and
details of implemented algorithms based on the generic model
along with the performance measurement.
A. Generic Model of Pseudorandom Number Generator
Keeping under consideration the desirable properties and
model guidelines mentioned in Section 2.2. Adopting and in
some cases modifying the design recommendations of [1, 11,
17, 16, 19, 20] to suit the smart card environment, we have put
forward a generic model as illustrated in figure 2. The chosen
architecture of the smart card PRNG is a slight modification
of the [14, 21, 22].This, with minimal modification, can be
implemented in most commercially available smart cards.
Fig. 2. Generic Model for Pseudorandom Number Generator in Smart Cards
1) The Input Formatting Function (IFF) retrieves the seed
value from the Cyclic Buffer (CB). The CB provides the
entropy source to the PRNG in smart cards. Typically
a CB (also can be referred as seed file) stores ten
random seed values and each value is used/updated
sequentially. The IFF processes the data to meet the
input requirements of the Generator Algorithm (GA).
The IFF keeps the record of which value to fetch on
each execution and this value is referred as the seed
index.
2) The output generated by the IFF is processed by the
Generator Algorithm (GA). A GA is actually a crypto-
graphic function (i.e. Hash [23], MAC [23], DES [24],
and AES [25] etc). The choice of the GA is with the
smart card developers (or implementers).
3) The output of the GA is fed to Seed Update Generator
(SUG). The SUG will generate the value that is used in
the seed update process and also back to IFF. The basic
architecture of SUG is that is Xor the input to GA with
its output. If the input/output mismatch in length, then it
concatenate the shorter length with itself until it is equal
to the other one.
4) The output of the SUG is processed by the Seed File
Update Function (SFUF). The SFUF fetches the update
value (to input seed) and Xor with the SUGs output.
The result is written back to the same location from
where the SFUF fetches the value. The update value
can be seed index 1 and this method is used in all of
the implementations in this paper.
The output of the SUG is fed back to the IFF for the
second round. In the second round the step 1 and 2
are performed again. However, the output of the GA is
not sent to SUG, instead it goes to Output Formatting
Function (OFF). This additional iteration of step 1 and
2 is performed mainly to conceal the value that is used
to update the seed file (Cyclic Buffer).
5) The Output Formatting Function receives an input from
the GA and it formats this output to the requirements
stipulated by the requesting user or application. Once
it formats the input to desired output, it sends the
pseudorandom number to requesting entity.
4B. Implemented Algorithms
Based on the generic model for Pseudorandom Number
Generator (PRNG) described in the previous section, six
implementations with varying Generator Algorithms (GAs)
were done. These implementations were not just the change in
the GA but also the related functions shown in the figure. The
implemented algorithms are illustrated in Appendix A. Table I
is the list of cryptographic algorithms used as the GAs, input
seed requirements, generated pseudorandom sequence length
[19].
TABLE I
ALGORITHMS WITH INPUT AND OUTPUT LENGTH
Generator Algorithm Input Length (bits) Output Length (bits)
SHA - 1 440 128
SHA - 256 440 128
HMAC - DES 128 128
HMAC - AES 128 128
DES 128 128
AES 128 128
For the experiments, all implementations were in Java Card.
For initial testing, we implemented them on a simulator (Java
Card simulator JCWDE [26]) and later on live cards. The
JCWDE provide support for all of the algorithms in the
above-mentioned table. The test environment was set on a
1.8 GHz PC with 512 RAM. An application that requested
pseudorandom sequences from PRNG installed in JCWDE and
also from the live cards was developed in Java 1.5 and it stored
the generated results to a binary file. To verify the accuracy
of the sample taken from the Java Card simulator, we also
conducted tests on the live cards and found out that the results
were the same. For this comparison, we used the same seed
file for both the simulator environment and live card PRNG.
The following table shows the size of each implementation
in EEPROM. In commercial implementation, only the seed file
is in EEPROM and not the code of the PRNG which would be
part of the Smart Card Operating System and resides in ROM.
The values shown in table II are code and seed file sizes. The
proposed model works with any size of seed file as long as it
provides high entropy. However, for our experiments we used
the seed file of the size mentioned in the following table.
TABLE II
ALGORITHMS WITH INPUT REQUIREMENTS AND PRODUCED OUTPUT
LENGTH
Generator Program Size Seed File Size
SHA - 1 2086 bytes 550 bytes
SHA - 256 2123 bytes 550 bytes
HMAC - DES 2283 bytes 160 bytes
HMAC - AES 2299 bytes 160 bytes
DES 2245 bytes 160 bytes
AES 2189 bytes 160 bytes
C. Pseudorandom Number Generator’s Performance Analysis
Once the algorithms were implemented on the live cards,
we conducted the performance tests. Before going into the
details of these tests, one thing to note is that these tests
were conducted on the PRNG that were implemented in the
Java Card language [26] running over the Java Card Virtual
Machine [27]. This architecture cannot be considered the most
efficient way of implementing the PRNG. The PRNGs are
normally implemented in the native code by the smart card
manufacturer, so their performance will always be better then
our implementations. The reason for listing the performance
matrix in the paper is to present that a PRNG implemented
above the Smart Card Operating System (SCOS) [1] layer can
still be viable and perform efficiently. The performance matrix
is the table that is used to record the measurements of the
algorithm execution.
Smart Card Reader
Computer
Performance Matrix
Oscilloscope
Vcc I/O
Fig. 3. Performance Measurement Framework
The basic framework to measure the performance of a
PRNG is illustrated in the figure 3. The smart card is inserted
in to a smart card reader that is connected to an oscilloscope.
A test application executes a script that selects a PRNG and
then request 128 bits of random number. The time a smart
card takes from receiving the request till producing an output
is calculated from the oscilloscope and the means value is
taken for the performance measurement.
For performance analysis we selected two 16-bit Java Cards
(from different manufacturers) and implemented the PRNG
algorithms (at application layer) based on the design illustrated
in figure 2 with adequate modifications (see Appendix A).
Each algorithm has a performance matrix that is generated
by 1000 measurements from each card. Table III illustrates
that the fastest PRNG implementation on a smart card are
Hash based generators. This table does not depicts the best
PRNG as in addition to the performance each PRNG should
also be evaluated for their randomness and security properties
before making the decision to use it in any application. The
NIST Statistical Test Suit SP 800-22 is used for the evaluation
of randomness in the generated output. The details of the
statistical tests for each of the algorithms are listed in the
table IV.
D. Theoretical Proof
Proof that the algorithms based on the proposed model
satisfy the desirable security properties of PRNG mentioned
in 2.2 is as follow:
1) Backtracking Resistance: Basing the model on a well-
established cryptographic principle ensures that even
after gaining knowledge of the inner state, an adversary
still cannot predict previous outputs. As Hash functions
are inherently irreversible, where in MAC and symmet-
ric functions, knowledge of the keys used is essential
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PERFORMANCE MEASURE (MILISECONDS)
Performance Measure SHA-1 SHA-256 HMAC-DES HMAC-AES DES AES
Card One
Average T ime 43.85 48.39 272.29 273.29 156.56 154.98
Fastest T ime 40.27 44.83 267.80 269.17 151.76 150.00
Slowest T ime 55.57 53.39 287.89 282.80 168.19 165.26
Standard Deviation 4.48 3.13 5.12 4.22 4.21 4.50
Card Two
Average T ime 42.84 47.64 263.87 263.02 156.56 148.02
Fastest T ime 39.45 44.08 257.32 257.32 151.76 144.54
Slowest T ime 54.01 58.86 272.17 272.11 168.19 152.01
Standard Deviation 4.40 4.23 3.57 3.70 4.21 2.37
in backtracking. Which is computationally equivalent to
finding pre-image or exhaustive key search respectively.
2) Prediction Resistance: To ensure that an algorithm is
prediction resistant, regular reseeding is required, which
is a non-preferable operation in smart cards. For this
reason, our implementations provided limited or no
prediction resistance. This is not due to the model of
the algorithms but due to the general security principle
adopted in smart cards.
3) Backward Secrecy: All of our algorithms are based
around strong cryptographic principles that inherently
provide backward secrecy. To compromise our proposed
model, an adversary first has to break them e.g. SHA-
256, AES, which is computationally equivalent to find-
ing a pre-image in the case of hash functions or an
exhaustive key search.
4) Forward Secrecy: To provide forward secrecy, the num-
ber of times a PRNG can execute should have a limit.
This limit is left to the smart card developer and the
intended application use.
There are special attacks on the smart card-based crypto-
graphic algorithms known as side channel attacks [15]. They
make even the best algorithms (AES) weak by reducing the
complexity of a key search drastically. These attacks gather a
large number of observations and analyse them statistically.
If all of these observations are generated by a single key,
then there is a high probability that side channel attacks can
recover it. However, as our implementations use a new key
per execution without affecting the overall randomness of
the generated output. The side channel attacks may not be
as successful as in previous case. Any algorithms presented
cannot remain secure because they are based on cryptographic
principles. Preventive measures with regard to these attacks
also have to be implemented at the hardware and software
code levels. Therefore, at model level there is not much we
can do to prevent such attacks. Thus, the protection of the
proposed algorithms from these attacks is based on the overall
security of the smart card hardware protection mechanism and
on secure coding practice.
E. Experimental Proof
To provide experimental proof, the NIST statistical test suite
was applied. Each algorithm was provided with a common
seed file, and generated sequences from it were saved in a
binary file. This binary file was used as input to the statistical
test. Point to note here is that seed files given to all algorithms
were the same. The reason for doing so was to analyse
differences in the quality of output while using the same
entropy source.
For statistical analysis, each algorithm was executed to
generate 1,048,578 pseudorandom sequences of 128 bits.
Concatenating the outputs into a binary file that was then used
for NIST SP 800-22 statistical analysis. The results of each
algorithm are listed in Appendix A. Taking into account the
Common Criteria AIS 20 [18], our implementation fulfils the
requirements for the K4 DRNG. Below is the discussion on
how our implementation satisfies these requirements.
1) K1 DRNG: Its a simple requirement that states that if
the generated values is of set C ={ c1, c2, c3, .., cm }
then all members of the set should be distinct regardless
of the statistical properties.
2) K2 DRNG: Requires that the implementation should
satisfy the statistical properties such as monobit test,
poker test and tests on runs. Our implementations were
subjected to the NIST SP 800-22 test suite.
3) K3 DRNG: This requires that the entropy of the PRNG
is at least 80. All SHA based algorithms has 440 bits
seed and block cipher based algorithms has 128 bits
seed. All of the seed values were chosen from an
external high entropy source that is carefully tested.
4) K4 DRNG: This level requires that the PRNG should be
forward-secure. A PRNG is forward-secure if after n it-
eration of the PRNG, a malicious user is unable to guess
the internal state of the generator. The implemented
PRNG feed back to the internal seed that is changing in
each of the iterations. Furthermore, block cipher based
implementation of the PRNG use different key in each
of the iterations. Even retrieving a cryptographic key
would not help a malicious user to successfully know
the entire state of the seed file.
In our implementations we tested SHA and block cipher
based algorithms for the PRNGs. In general block cipher based
algorithms, only a single key is used for the entire lifetime of
the generator. However, we have tested that a PRNG could be
modified to use a new key on each execution of the generator.
The internal key generation mechanism of the block cipher
based PRNG implementations are light weight and they do not
hamper the overall performance of the generator. Therefore, it
could be argued that it provides a more secure block cipher
based PRNG then an PRNG that only uses a single key for
entire lifetime.
Table IV details the percentage of passing sequences pro-
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NIST STATISTICAL TEST RESULTS (PERCENTAGE OF PASSING SEQUENCES)
Algo / NIST Tests 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
SHA-1 98.60 98.99 99.00 98.00 100 99.04 100 100 100 98.00 100 99.00 98.81 99.47
SHA-256 99.30 100 97.00 97.00 98.97 98.78 100 98.00 99.00 99.50 99.00 98.00 98.86 100
HMAC-DES 99.20 100 97.00 99.00 98.97 99.04 99.00 100 98.00 100 100 98.00 100 97.62
HMAC-AES 99.30 100 99.00 100 100 99.01 98.00 97.00 97.00 99.50 94.00 98.50 99.04 100
DES 99.20 98.99 100 100 100 97.98 100 99.00 100 99.00 97.00 99.00 96.67 96.67
AES 99.20 97.98 96.00 97.00 98.97 97.98 98.00 99.00 99.00 100 96.00 98.50 100 100
duced by individual algorithms. As it is evident from table III
and IV, there is not a big difference between the implemented
algorithms both in terms of performance and percentage of
sequence passing the NIST statistical tests. Of particular note,
if we take the accumulated average of the passing sequences
percentage in the table IV an interesting result emerges. The
SHA-1 performs comparative better than other algorithms
and AES based PRNG has the least accumulated average
of passing sequence as illustrated in figure 4. This measure
represents the randomness of the generated sequences - not
the security of the algorithm. If we also account for the
performance, SHA based algorithms perform better than the
encryption based algorithms (e.g. DES and AES).
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
All of the algorithms proposed in this paper used hardware-
based cryptographic primitives as GAs. While PRNGs can
be entirely software-based, the resource-restricted environment
and FIPS 140-2 requirements [14] compelled the model to be
partially based on hardware implementations.
Another deviation was from the standard method of imple-
menting PRNG from hash and block cipher-based algorithms
given in NIST SP 800-90 [19] and ISO/IEC 18031[20]. We
only consider one proposal to state our reason for not follow-
ing it faithfully. The hash-based PRNG presented by NIST [19]
contains three iterations of hash function. This would increase
the time of execution without giving any substantial increase
in randomness. The inclusion of additional input to the process
is not viable in the smart card environment, because there is
not enough random or diverse information available for this
purpose. As reseeding in the smart card is not preferred, there
was no need to include a reseeding counter, while a simple
counter was not implemented due to the limited write cycles
of the EEPROM memory.
Our research into the possibility of using a test suite like
NIST SP 800-SP to check pseudorandom number generators in
smart cards has showed that it is a workable concept. The tests
listed in the NIST SP 800-22 are substantially more then the
one recommended for the smart card pseudorandom number
generators in AIS20 [18] and AIS31 [13]. This research has
demonstrated that even with limited resources and an entropy
constrained environment like a smart card, good quality pseu-
dorandom sequences can be generated that can satisfy all the
requirements for a PRNG even the ones that are used for
general purpose computers.
We would like to extend the statistical test suite to include
other tests that are not included in the NIST statistical suite and
analyse whether the implemented algorithms satisfies them or
not. Due to unavailability of native implementation of different
algorithms (e.g. MD5 and T-DES) in the test cards, we could
not test them for their randomness by generating sequences on
Java Card simulator; however, lack of performance measure
on an actual smart card prohibited us from including them
to the analysis. Therefore, we would like to incorporate these
algorithms along with testing the algorithms from public key
cryptography (e.g. ECC) to illustrate their performance in the
smart card environment.
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APPENDIX
Following table shows the list of tests from NIST statis-
tical test suit and the input parameters mentioned calculated
according to [2] guideline.
TABLE V
NIST SP 800 - 22 STATISTICAL TESTS INPUT PARAMETERS
Statistical Test Outputs Output Size
1. Frequency Test (Monobit) 1000 2000
2. Frequency Test (Block) 99 12672
3. Runs Test 100 16384
4. Longest Run of Ones 100 750000
5. Binary Matrix Rank Test 97 38912
6. Non-Overlapping Template 99 131072
7. Maurers Universal Statistical 100 1048576
8. Overlapping Template 100 1000000
9. Linear Complexity Test 100 1048576
10. Serial Test 100 1048576
11. Approximate Entropy Test 100 1048576
12. Cumulative Sums (Cusum) Test 100 128
13. Random Excursions Test 100 1048576
14. Random Excursion Variant Test 100 1048576
